IP traceback through (authenticated) deterministic flow marking: an empirical evaluation by Vahid Aghaei-Foroushani & A Nur Zincir-Heywood
Aghaei-Foroushani and Zincir-Heywood EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2013, 2013:5
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/5
RESEARCH Open Access
IP traceback through (authenticated)
deterministic flow marking: an empirical
evaluation
Vahid Aghaei-Foroushani* and A Nur Zincir-Heywood
Abstract
In this paper, we present a novel approach to IP traceback - deterministic flow marking (DFM). We evaluate this novel
approach against two well-known IP traceback schemes. These are the probabilistic packet marking (PPM) and the
deterministic packet marking (DPM) techniques. In order to do so, we analyzed these techniques in detail in terms of
their performances and feasibilities on five Internet traces. These traces consist of Darpa 1999 traffic traces, CAIDA
October 2012 traffic traces, MAWI December 2012 traffic traces, and Dal2010 traffic traces. We have employed 16
performance metrics to evaluate their performances. The empirical results show that the novel DFM technique can
reduce the number of marked packets by 91% compared to the DPM, while achieving the same or better
performance in terms of its ability to trace back the attack. Additionally, DFM provides an optional authentication so
that a compromised router cannot forge markings of other uncompromised routers. Unlike PPM and DPM that trace
the attack up to the ingress interface of the edge router close to the attacker, DFM allows the victim to trace the origin
of incorrect or spoofed source addresses up to the attacker node, even if the attack has been originated from a
network behind a network address translation (NAT) server. Our results show that DFM can reach up to approximately
99% traceback rate with no false positives.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, much attention has been paid for securing
the Internet infrastructure that has become a universal
medium for a broad range of communications. Several
security approaches have been proposed for securing this
infrastructure. The specific security issue, which is the
main focus of this study, is anonymous attacks. Due to
the trusting nature of the IP protocol, which originally did
not include security as a design principle, the source IP
address of a packet is not authenticated. Attackers are usu-
ally interested in hiding their identity with fake addresses.
(Distributed) Denial of Service ((D)DoS) attacks are an
example of anonymous attacks where currently there is no
obvious way to prevent or trace them.While preventing all
attacks on the Internet is far from reality, at least a mech-
anism of identifying the source(s) of the attack is needed
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in a situation when prevention fails. This is the reason for
designing IP traceback techniques. Traceback is a name
given to any method for reliably determining the origin of
traffic on the network.
To the best of our knowledge, the state-of-the-art trace-
back methods in the literature are able to detect only
up to the autonomous system (AS) level or at best, the
edge router of the attacker network, because proxies and
network address translations (NATs) make it difficult to
differentiate activities from distinct hosts. In these cases,
to defend against attacks, the victim filters out all traf-
fic belonging to the attacker network after identifying the
origin of the attack.
Consider a scenario where a computer in a large net-
work, such as a university, starts (D)DoS attack by spoof-
ing its IP address against a public server (victim). At best,
if an IP traceback technique has been utilized in both
the university network and the victim side, the victim
would be able to identify that the attacker’s network is
the university network. When the victim starts filtering
© 2013 Aghaei-Foroushani and Zincir-Heywood; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Aghaei-Foroushani and Zincir-Heywood EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2013, 2013:5 Page 2 of 24
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/5
out any traffic from this network, many computers at the
university network that have not been involved in the
attack will also be filtered out.
In general, there are two ways for routing the network
traffic from a local network to the Internet:
1. Valid IP addresses are assigned to the local nodes. The
edge router only routes the traffic to and from the
Internet. We call these networks as ‘valid networks’.
2. An invalid IP address is assigned to each node in the
local network. In addition to routing, the edge router
should do the network address translation. We call
these networks as ‘invalid networks’.
Table 1 shows the differences of these two networks
from the perspective of a destination node outside of these
networks. As can be seen in this table, only in a situa-
tion when a computer does not send spoofed source IP
address packets from a valid network that the destina-
tion is able to distinguish the exact source of this traffic.
In the other three situations, the destination is not able
to identify the source node, i.e., the origin of the traffic.
Therefore, in the case of attack traffic coming from such
networks, the destination (in this case the victim) has to
filter out all the traffic flows originating from the attacker’s
network.
In this research, we aim to deal with such a problem
and propose an IP traceback method to be able to iden-
tify the actual attacking machine as accurate as possible in
a given network. First of all, we present a brief survey of
two promising schemes for tracing cyber-attacks, the well-
known probabilistic packet marking (PPM) and the deter-
ministic packet marking (DPM) approaches. Then we
present a novel approach to IP traceback - deterministic
flow marking (DFM). We explore the PPM and DPM in
detail and then by investigating the DFM, we analyze the
advantages and disadvantages of all three approaches in
depth in terms of practicality and feasibility so that the
shortcomings of each scheme are highlighted. We employ
five different Internet traces (data sets) including Darpa
1999 attack and attack free, Cooperative Association for
Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) Internet traces October
2012, measurement and analysis of WIDE-area Internet
(MAWI) December 2012, and Dalhousie 2010 data sets,
and use 16 metrics to evaluate the performance of dis-
parate traceback schemes. The metrics employed in this
work are the following: the computational overhead, the
memory overhead, the bandwidth overhead, the traceback
rate, the false-positive rate, mark spoofing by attackers
or subverted routers in the attack path, the awareness
of the attack path length, the network map and the
routing in advance, the number of required packets for
traceback, the percentage of marked packets, Internet ser-
vice providers (ISP) involvement, the ability to handle
fragmentation, the ability to handle major DDoS attacks,
and the maximum traceback ability.
The main characteristics of our research that distin-
guishes it from other methods include the following:
1. We propose a generalized deterministic flow
marking scheme, DFM, which is scalable to large
distributed attacks. DFM outperforms PPM and
DPM in that it can handle larger-scale DDoS attacks
because the maximum number of concurrent
attackers in PPM and DPM is limited, whereas there
is no such limitation in DFM.
2. Although deterministic IP traceback methods have
higher traceback accuracy in comparison to
probabilistic marking approaches, this accuracy is
achieved by marking all the packets in the network.
Deterministic methods need to process every packet
and obviously, they incur more processing overhead
[1]. In our proposed DFM technique, we aim to
minimize this overhead. To achieve this, given that
all packets in a flow belong to the same source, we
mark every flow, instead of every packet. This leads
us to have both advantages of high traceback
accuracy of deterministic methods and low
processing overhead of probabilistic approaches
simultaneously. Our experimental results show that
the proposed DFM method has approximately 99%
traceback rate with 0% false-positive rate, while it
may reduce the number of required packets to be
marked for tracing back by 90%.
3. Most of the traceback methods assume that the
marking information remains unchanged for as long
as the packet traverses the network. Unfortunately,
such an assumption is not realistic given the issue of
mark spoofing by forged routers. DFM totally
eliminates the threat of mark spoofing, not only if
spoofed marking is inscribed by the attacker, but also
if it is incurred by the compromised routers in the
attack path. We show that this can be accomplished
by using optional authenticated flow marking.
Table 1 The differences between valid and invalid networks
Network type Sending legitimate flows Sending attack flows
Valid Destination is able to identify the origin of traffic If an attacker spoofs its source IP address, the destination (victim)
cannot identify the origin of the attack traffic
Invalid Destination cannot identify the origin of traffic The destination (victim) cannot identify the origin of the attack traffic
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4. Finally, unlike DPM that traces the attack up to the
ingress interface of the edge router close to the
attacker, DFM allows the victim to trace the origin of
the incorrect or the spoofed source addresses up to
the attacker node, even if the attack has been
originated from a network behind a NAT server.
The rest of this paper has the following structure:
Section 2 summarizes the related work on IP trace-
back and various traceback schemes are classified from
multiple aspects. Then, the actual schemes of PPM,
DPM, our proposed DFM, and its optional authen-
ticated flow marking feature are presented; and the
implications and the challenges associated with each
of them are discussed from the perspective of practi-
cality and feasibility in Sections 3, 4, and 5, respec-
tively. Finally, we provide a comprehensive comparison
table for all schemes and present our conclusions in
Section 6.
2 Literature review on IP traceback
So far, many traceback approaches have been proposed.
According to [1] and [2], we classify existing approaches
from multiple viewpoints. Three aspects are selected to
classify existing traceback schemes into several categories.
They include the basic principle, processing mode, and
location.
According to classification by the basic principle, most
of the existing tracebackmethods are categorized into log-
ging and marking groups. In logging methods, the routers
keep some specific information of traveling packets [3].
For example, Snoeren et al. [4] have suggested generating
a fingerprint of the packet, based upon the invariant por-
tions of the packet (source, destination, etc.) and the first
8 bytes of the payload. During the traceback, the routers
can verify if a suspicious packet has been forwarded or
not. Further improvement in terms of logging only a small
portion of each traveling packet at the transient routers
have been proposed in [5]. One of the major problems of
the logging method is the requirement for high amount
of memory and CPU usage on the routers in the attack
paths [6]. In marking methods, some or all routers in an
attack path send specific information along with traveling
packets. The destination may use this information to trace
the attacker even if the source IP has been spoofed. This
information could be either embedded in the packet’s IP
header or sent by generating new packets and consume
extra bandwidth [7-10]. In particular, Savage et al. [11]
have described a technique for tracing anonymous packet
flooding attacks on the Internet towards their source. This
traceback can be performed after an attack is identified.
While each marked packet represents only a sample of the
path it has traversed, by combining a modest number of
such packets, a victim can reconstruct the entire attack
path. Dean et al. [12] have presented a scheme for provid-
ing traceback data by having routers embedding specific
information into packets randomly. This is similar to the
technique used by Savage et al. [11], with the major dif-
ference being that it is based on algebraic techniques.
On the other hand, Song et al. [13] present two new
IP marking techniques to solve the IP traceback prob-
lem: the advanced marking scheme and the authenticated
marking scheme. The authenticated marking scheme sup-
ports authentication of routers’ markings. This prevents
a compromised router from forging other uncompro-
mised routers’ markings. Doeppner et al. [14] identified
the source of Denial of Service attacks, provided that a
significant percentage of packets are sent from one sub-
net. In this method, each router marks its own IP address
to the traveling packet with a determinable probability.
Moreover, Tseng et al. [15] have proposed a modification
to PPM [11] to ensure that the probability of receiving
the mark is equal to the original marking probability. Yaar
et al. [16] have proposed a method of encoding path iden-
tification by marking packets with path fingerprints. They
have also another research [17] based on the PPM [11]
with further improvements such as 1-bit distance. Victims
can identify attack paths after receiving tens of packets
encoding. It detects the distance of the attacker by chang-
ing the time to live (TTL) field and storing 1 bit in the IP
header. Goodrich et al. [18] have proposed to use relatively
large randomized messages to encode router informa-
tion. The main idea is to have each router fragment its
message into several words and include a large check-
sum cord on the entire message randomly in the reusable
bits of such a word fragment. Instead of the recovery of
the full paths, Belenky et al. [19] and [20], proposed to
only record the IP addresses of ingress edge routers. Their
scheme, DPM, is simple and easy to implement, and has
a little overhead on routers and the victim. This scheme
has low processing and memory overhead at the victim
machines and edge routers. Additionally, DFM provides
an optional authentication so that a compromised router
cannot forge markings of other uncompromised routers.
Yang et al. [21] take advantage of both marking and log-
ging methods and combines both approaches at routers
in an attack path. Most marking methods use 16 bits
of identification field such as in [11,13,15-17]. However,
some other works propose to use 17 bits (identification
field and reserved flag) [20,22], 25 bits (identification and
type of service (TOS) fields plus reserved flag) [12,18,23],
or 32 bits (identification field, flag, and fragment offset)
[9,21].
From the perspective of the classification based on the
processing mode, traceback schemes may be categorized
into two groups: deterministic and probabilistic. In deter-
ministic methods, regardless of the marking or logging,
every packet should be processed at both the source and
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the destination side. In comparison to the probabilistic
methods, these methods require more processing over-
head but their advantage is providing higher accuracy. An
example of probabilistic logging is proposed by Snoeren
et al. [4], which was discussed earlier. There are some
researches on deterministic marking as well. For exam-
ple, the suggested idea by Belenky and Ansari [20] is to
store, with random probability of 0.5, the upper or the
lower half of the IP address of the ingress interface into the
fragment ID field of the packet, and then set a reserve bit
indicating which portion of the address is contained in the
fragment field. The proposed method by Rayanchu and
Barua [22] is similar to Belenky and Ansari [20], but the
difference is that they do not embed the IP address in the
IP header; instead they only embed the hash of the edge
router’s IP address. Most of the recent traceback meth-
ods are probabilistic. While the required bandwidth and
processing time in these methods are less than the ones
required by the deterministic methods, the complexity for
reconstruction at the destination side is more. Some well-
known examples of probabilistic methods are PPM [11]
and many of its variants [15,17], ATA [12], iTrace [7], and
others such as in [9,13,14,16-18].
From the perspective of the classification by locations,
existing traceback methods are divided into two types:
those that send traceback information by the edge routers
closest to the source (source group) and in the net-
work by some or all routers in the attack path (network
group), respectively. Most of the current traceback meth-
ods belong to the network group [11-14]. The purpose of
thesemethods is to identify the attack path entirely or par-
tially [9,15-17]. The drawbacks of these methods are the
involvement of the routers along the paths and the cost
of their processing times and memories for this purpose
[4,21,23]. While the goal of source group methods is to
identify the attack source, they do not identify the attack
path [18,20,22].
Furthermore, the proposed methods in [9,23,24] trace
up to the autonomous system (AS) level, while the other
aforementioned works trace up to the edge router of the
attack source. Song et al. [13] and Goodrich et al. [18]
have proposed authenticationmarkingmethods, while the
other aforementioned works send their marking informa-
tion in clear text that are susceptible for mark changing
in the case of existing compromised routers in the net-
work path. Wang et al. [25] proposed a framework for
‘Sleepy Watermark Traceback (SWT)’ (i.e., watermarking
and tracing packets to the attacker’s source IP address,
only if the IDS subsystem has determined that there is
an attack in progress). This technique is based on traf-
fic timing and is quite different from the ones mentioned
above in that it injects non-displayable contents into
packets. SWT has the following assumptions: (1) Intru-
sions are interactive and bidirectional. This paper refers
to intrusions as those attacks aiming to gain unautho-
rized access, rather than Denial of Service attacks, so
it is not able to trace back Denial of Service attacks
that are bidirectional, and attempts to block access to
the targeted server by consuming computing resources
on the server and by consuming all of the bandwidth
of the network connecting the server to the Internet.
(2) Routers are trustworthy. (3) There is no link-to-link
encryption. So this method is vulnerable to encrypted
traffic.
In our previous work, we proposed the DFM approach
which allows the victim to trace back the origin of an
incorrect or spoofed source IP address up to the attacker
node, even if the attack has been originated from a net-
work behind a NAT server [26]. DFM is a deterministic
approach, which marks every flow (in contrast with mak-
ing every packet) and performs on the edge router near
the source of traffic. We have shown that using DFM may
reduce as many as 90% of marked packets on average
required for tracing attacks with no false positives, while it
eliminates the spoofed marking embedded by the attacker
as well as compromised routers in the attack path in [27].
3 Probabilistic packet marking
In this section, we describe the probabilistic packet mark-
ing method called PPM. Based on various IP traceback
approaches described in Section 2, PPM falls into the fol-
lowing categories: basic principle - marking, processing
modes - probabilistic, and location - network group.
This approach is based on the idea that all routers in
the attack path select the packets that pass through them
randomly, with a constant probability, and then mark the
selected packets by their own IP address (i.e., write a por-
tion of their own IP address in the packet IP header). Once
the victim gets a large amount of marked packets, it can
reconstruct the attack path, even if the IP addresses of the
packets have been spoofed. This approach, Figure 1, had
been introduced by [28] and later has been improved by
[8]. Assume that there are d routers in an attack path and
the marking probability of each of these routers is a con-
stant number p. The optimal value for p is 1/d. However,
from the viewpoint of victim, the marking probability of
router Ri (1 => i <= d) is p(1 − p)d−i that is different
than P [15,29]. It is because subsequent routers may over-
ride (re-mark) the packets that have been marked by the
previous routers. In other words, the routers that are fur-
ther away from the victim are, more likely to be overridden
by the subsequence routers. Thus, the closest router to the
victim has the highest chance to deliver its marks in the
attack path.
3.1 Mark decoding by destination
In this approach, there are two fields, addr and dist, that
play the main role in the packet marking. Both of these
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Figure 1 A schematic illustration of PPM approach. All routers in the attack path take part in the traceback.
fields have been embedded in the identification field of
packet IP header. Once a router decides to mark a packet
(i.e., this decision is independent of other routers), it
writes its own IP address to the addr field and zero in dist
field. Otherwise, if the router gets a packet that its dist
field is zero, it indicates that this packet has been marked
by the previous router. In this case, the router would XOR
its own IP address with the addr field of themarked packet
and would override the result into the addr field again.
Finally, if the router does not mark the packet, it always
adds one to the dist field.
Figure 2 shows the marking process in an attack path
with three routers R1, R2, and R3. In the R1 router, there
are two cases. The box on the left shows the case that
the R1 marks the packets (i.e., it writes its own IP address
in addr field and set the dist field to zero), and the box
on the right shows the unmarking case by the R1 router
(i.e., it just adds one to the dist field). In the R2 router,
there are four cases, two boxes on the left show a situation
where the R1 router has previously marked the packets.
Of these two boxes, the box on the left shows the case
that the R2 router marks the packet again (i.e., it writes
its own IP address in the addr field and set the dist field
to zero), and the box on the right shows the case that the
R2 router does not mark the packet (i.e., it XOR its own
IP address with the addr field, overrides the result into
the addr field, and add one to the dist field). On the other
hand, two boxes on the right show a situation where the
R1 router has not previously marked the packets. Of these
two boxes, the box on the left shows the case that the R2
router marks the packet (i.e., it writes its own IP address
in the addr field and set the dist field to zero), and the
box on the right shows the case that R2 router does not
mark the packet (i.e., it just adds one to the dist field).
Using the same process for the R3 router, the victim would
get eight results. However, some of these eight marking
results are similar. For example, boxes number 1, 3, 5, and
7 have the same marking information. By eliminating the
duplicate results, four non-repetitive cases remain for the
victim.
For the path reconstruction, first of all the victim locates
the closest router to itself (i.e., R3 in Figure 2) by looking
for the packet where the dist field is equal to zero. Sec-
ondly, because R3⊕ (R2⊕R3) = R2, the victim can locate
the R2 router by looking for the packet where the dist field
is equal to 1, and XOR its addr field with the IP address
of the R3 router. The victim continues this process until
locating the router that is the most far away.
3.2 PPM analysis
Although PPM has several good advantages such as zero
bandwidth overhead (i.e., all marking information stored
in the packet IP header), PPM has the following serious
weaknesses in the face of DDoS attacks.
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Figure 2 The marking process of PPM. The marking process in an attack path with three routers R1, R2, and R3.
3.2.1 Computational overhead
For each packet, there is a computational overhead to
decide if the packet should be marked or not. In addition,
if the packet is marked, there are some more computa-
tional overheads such as preparing the marking informa-
tion and upgrading the addr and the dist fields. However,
in comparison to the computational overhead at the vic-
tim side for path reconstruction, the computational over-
head of the routers in the attack path is negligible. Authors
in [13] show that when there are 25 concurrent attacks
to a victim, path reconstruction may take several days
with thousands of false positives, while the current DDoS
attackers may orchestrate thousands of attack zombies at
the same time. In this situation, the victim may never
reconstruct the attack path.
3.2.2 Memory overhead
The memory overhead on routers is highly undesirable
because it reduces the network performance and requires
hardware upgrade. Since the marking process on routers
does not store anything, the router’s memory overhead
in PPM algorithms is negligible. But on the victim side,
a large memory structure for the attack path reconstruc-
tion process is required. The victim should store millions
of records in the data structure, and then search on it, to
reconstruct the attack path. However, memory overhead
on the victim machine is more tolerable than the one on
the routers.
3.2.3 False positives
PPM has a high false-positive rate in the face of DDoS
attacks. This problem is originated from the basis of the
reconstruction algorithm. In this case, the victim should
perform two processes; first of all, it should gain the IP
addresses of all routers in the attack path and secondly,
using the router’s IP addresses, reconstructs the attack
path. In PPM, eight packets marked by the same router
need to be identified and combined to resume the IP
address of that router [9]. Since there is no more sign in
the dist field, in a situation when there are several attack
paths, it is difficult for the victim to identify whichmarked
packets belong to which router because there are lots of
routers in the same distance to the victim. This issue may
prevent the attack path reconstruction process.
3.2.4 Mark spoofing by attackers
If the attacker is aware of the existing PPM marking pro-
cess in the network, he/she may send fake marked packets
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to the victim. In this situation, the victim may not be able
to reconstruct the attack path correctly because the vic-
tim cannot differentiate between the fake and the genuine
marked packets.
3.2.5 Mark spoofing by subverted routers
There are two kinds of malfunctioning routers that may
disrupt the traceback operation by the victim. First of all,
the incorrect configured routers that participate in the
PPMpacket markingmay confuse the path reconstruction
process. Secondly, the compromised routers can prepare
and send fake marked packets that can most likely prevent
the victim to trace back to the attack source.
3.2.6 Awareness of the attack path length in advance
As described before, the optimal value of marking prob-
ability, p, is 1/d. However, once a router decides to mark
a packet, it does not have any idea about its path length,
d, so it cannot set the p to the optimal value. Authors
in [8] suggest to use the constant number 0.04 for p.
However, if the victim is under several attacks with differ-
ent attack path lengths, using the predetermined constant
number for p strongly reduces the efficiency of the path
reconstruction process.
3.2.7 Awareness of the networkmap and the routing in
advance
The PPM algorithm works based on an assumption that
the victim should be aware of the network map and the
routing in advance to be able to reconstruct the attack
path using the IP addresses of the routers among the path
extracted from the received marked packets. So the con-
cern in this case is how to keep the victim updated about
the network map and routing; otherwise, whenever a new
router is added to the network, the path reconstruction
process will not work correctly.
3.2.8 The number of required packets for traceback
In the first implementation of PPM algorithm, the vic-
tim requires thousands of packets to reconstruct an attack
path [8]. Later, this has been improved to less than 1,000
packets by [13]. However, the number is still high and
therefore is a serious drawback of the PPM algorithm.
3.2.9 Fragmentation
PPM uses ID field in the IP header of packets to embed
marking information, which is generally used for fragmen-
tation. If only a single packet of a fragmented datagram is
marked, then the datagram reassembly will fail.
3.2.10 ISP involvement
The path reconstruction process needs to get marked
packets from all routers among the attack path. To this
end, the marking process should be activated on all
routers in the network. However, what the Internet service
providers (ISPs) need to do is limited to updating the
router’s IOS and enabling the PPM on the routers. Hav-
ing said this, ISPs should do this on all routers, including
either edge or backbone routers. Indeed, the involvement
of all the routers is a major problem of using this method.
Given that, in practice it may cross boundaries of ISPs and
countries.
3.3 Discussion
So far, several variations of PPM have been proposed
[8,15,17]. For example, to counter with ‘awareness of the
attack path length in advance’ problem, there are some
works [9,23,24] to set d as the number of AS, rather than
the number of routers, between the current network and
the victim. However, this solution cannot reconstruct the
attack path accurately, which is the main goal of the PPM
approach.
Song [13] has proposed an advanced and authenti-
cated marking scheme for IP traceback. Their approach
decreases the high computational overhead and false-
positive rate, as the number of the required marked pack-
ets for path reconstruction is less than 1,000 in their
approach and partially covers the mark spoofing prob-
lem. However, their approach cannot resist against the
compromised routers in the attack path, since a compro-
mised router may be reconfigured to mark the packets
incorrectly and still is authenticated by the victim. Unfor-
tunately, there is still no approach to cover the problem
of malfunctioned routers. Note that the computational
overhead and the false-positive rate are in direct propor-
tion; as the high computational cost increases, so does the
false-positive rate.
One possible solution to counter with the fragmentation
problem is to mark the fragmented packets with lower
probability. Therefore, the fragmented datagrams have
more chance to survive. However, this approach will defi-
nitely increase the number of required marked packets for
path reconstruction.
As described earlier, as the number of hops between
a router in the attack path and the victim increases, the
mark information of that specific router is less likely to
survive; so from the perspective of the victim, the farther-
most router has the lowest chance to deliver its mark in
the attack path. One solution to cancel this problem is to
use variable marking probability for each router, based on
the distance between the current router and the victim
[30]. However, the hard part is how to find the number of
hops between two ends.
Based on the above PPM specifications, PPM is a good
solution for small-scale DoS attacks. However, most of the
current attacks are large-scale DDoS attacks with hun-
dreds or thousands of concurrent attack sources. In these
cases, PPM is not a good choice. Therefore, researchers
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proposed another approach, called DPM [19], to over-
come some of the problems of the PPM approach.
4 Deterministic packet marking
DPM is a well-known IP traceback approach and pos-
sesses several attractive features such as its ease of imple-
mentation and low computational and memory overhead
on participating routers as well as the victim machines.
Based on various IP traceback approaches described in
Section 2, DFM falls into the following categories: basic
principle - marking, processing modes - deterministic at
packet level, and location - source group.
4.1 DPM scheme
The main goal of DPM, which was first proposed by
Belenky and Ansari [19] and later was improved by [20],
was to dominate on an obvious issue of PPM. The issue
was that each packet in a datagram network is being
routed individually so even if the sources and the destina-
tions of the packets are the same, they may be routed in
different paths. This feature of the packet networks may
prevent the attack path reconstruction by victim, using the
PPM algorithm. Since each packet may travel a different
route from the same source to the same destination, the
only address in the network path that is surely the same for
all packets is the ingress interface IP address of the closest
router to the source of packets. The main idea behind the
DPM is that the ingress interface IP address of the clos-
est router to the source of the packet is enough to find the
attacker network. It should be noted here that in the cur-
rent Internet network, the packet routing is mostly stable.
However, there is still this potential to route the packets
from different paths.
As it is shown in Figure 3, only the ingress interfaces of
the edge router marks the packets, and the rest, includ-
ing the backbone routers, are exempt. DPM uses 17 bits
of the IP header, including 16 bits identification field and
1 bit reserved flag, to embed the marking information to
every packet. The 32 bits ingress interface IP address is
split into two segments, with 16 bits each: segment 0 - bits
0 through 15 and segment 1 - bits 16 through 31. When
a packet passes through an edge router, one segment is
selected with equal probability and inserted in the identi-
fication field. The victim maintains a table matching the
source addresses to the ingress addresses. When the vic-
tim gets both segments of an edge router, then it is able to
reconstruct the whole ingress interface IP address of that
router. One-bit reserved flag plays the rule of a sign for the
victim to identify which part of the IP address is carried
by the current packet.
DPM has two key features: First of all, DPM only marks
the closest ingress edge router to the attacker, and sec-
ondly, DPM marks all packets at the ingress interface of
the edge routers.
Although the basic DPM approach can handle DoS
attacks, it has high false-positive rates under DDoS
attacks. The reason behind this is that the victim asso-
ciates segments of the ingress address with the source
address of the attacker. However, it is a well-known fact
that the source IP addresses may be spoofed. Under such
attacks, there are at least two cases when the edge router
IP address reconstruction may not be effective. Firstly,
two or more hosts that have the same source IP address
attack the victim and secondly, (D)DoS attackers simply
change the source address field for every packet they send.
In these cases, the basic DPM is unable to reconstruct
any valid ingress addresses [19]. To solve this problem,
they improved their basic DPM approach to use a hash
function to produce digests or hash values of the ingress
address [20]. They proposed that all packets belonging to
the ingress interface of an edge router carry the same hash
value. Using this hash value, the victim is able to match
the correct mark information to form a valid ingress IP
address. Therefore, the marking information is formed by
three parts: a segment of ingress address a, the index of
segment d, and digest of ingress address k. They claimed
that the best trade-off for the size of each of these param-
eters are a = 4, d = 3, and k = 10, all together 17
bits.
4.2 DPM analysis
To analyze the DPM, we have used the same evaluation
metrics that we used to analyze the PPM as discussed in
the succeeding sections.
4.2.1 Computational overhead
The CPU overhead of DPM is lower than the PPM
approach because unlike PPM, in DPM only the closest
edge router to the attacker is responsible for marking (not
all routers in the attack path). Moreover, since DPMmarks
every packet, there is no need for a decision process for
marking each packet. However, there are other computa-
tional overheads such as preparing marking information
and upgrading marking fields. Having said this, in DPM,
reconstructing the ingress interface IP address of the edge
router is much simpler than the attack path reconstruc-
tion process of the PPM approach. Therefore, in the face
of DDoS attacks, the victim is able to trace back to the
edge router in real time, if DPM is in use. Furthermore,
the hash values of the ingress address may be used as a
guide to effectively prevent the combinatorial explosion
problem of PPM.
4.2.2 Memory overhead
Like the PPM approach, the memory overhead on the
routers is negligible. However, unlike PPM where the vic-
tim requires a large memory structure to store millions of
records, in the DPM approach, the victim keeps a smaller
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Figure 3 A schematic illustration of DPM approach. Only the edge router takes part in traceback.
reconstruction table. It is because in PPM, the victim
needs almost 1,000 packets to reconstruct an attack path,
while in DPM, only 32/a packets are required to recon-
struct the ingress address (i.e., with the suggested a = 4
[20], DPM requires only eight packets to trace back to the
ingress interface address of the edge router close to the
attacker).
4.2.3 False positives
As discussed earlier, basic DPM method has a signif-
icant limitation to deal with multiple attackers at the
same time with the same source IP address. In this sit-
uation, the victim cannot recognize which marked frag-
ment should be concatenated together to form a valid
mark. This causes high false-positive rates. To counter
this problem, they propose another method to use a
hash function to produce hash values of the ingress
interface, called the single-digest DPM technique, or
to use a family of hash functions to produce multiple
digests of an ingress address, called the multiple-digest
DPM technique. In these techniques, hash values are
sent along with marked bits to effectively prevent the
combinatorial explosion problem. This modification to
DPM guarantees the false-positive rate not to go over
1%, if the number of concurrent attackers in a DDoS
attack is not more than a limited number. For exam-
ple, using 55 datagrams to be marked by the DPM-
enabled interface, the maximum number of simultaneous
attackers that can be traced back with the false-positive
rate not exceeding 1% in the single-digest DPM tech-
nique is 45, and in the multiple-digest DPM technique is
2,296 [20].
4.2.4 Mark spoofing by attackers
In the DPM approach, each packet is marked when it
enters the network. In this case, even if an attacker tries
to spoof the mark, the spoofed mark will be overwritten
with a correct mark. This automatically obviates the issue
of the mark spoofing which PPM has to account for.
4.2.5 Mark spoofing by subverted routers
DPM assumes that a mark remains unchanged for as long
as the packet traverses the network. As DPM does not
have any mechanism to authenticate the packet mark-
ing, this assumption automatically increases the issue of
mark spoofing by subverted routers in the attack path.
Thus, in an untrusted network such as the Internet and
in the case of a compromised router on the attack path,
the marking information could be changed and the des-
tination would be unable to identify the origin of the
traffic.
4.2.6 Awareness of the attack path length in advance
As the process of ingress interface IP address reconstruc-
tion does not need the path length, awareness of the attack
path length is not an issue in DPM.
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4.2.7 Awareness of the networkmap and the routing in
advance
As the goal of DPM is not reconstructing the attack path,
instead it reconstructs the ingress interface IP address of
the edge router, so the awareness of the network map and
the routing is not an issue.
4.2.8 The number of required packets for traceback
As discussed earlier, 32/a packets are required to recon-
struct the ingress address. By the suggested a = 4 [20],
DPM requires eight packets to trace back to the ingress
interface address of the edge router close to the attacker,
where a refers to the number of bits in a segment of the
ingress address field.
4.2.9 Fragmentation
Like PPM, DPM uses the ID field in the IP header of the
packets as well as 1-bit reserved flag to embed the mark-
ing information. If only a single packet of a fragmented
datagram is marked, then the datagram reassembly will
fail.
4.2.10 ISP involvement
In DPM, the involvement of the ISPs is very limited. Only
the edge routers have to be upgraded to support the func-
tion of the deterministic packet marking. Unlike PPM, the
other routers in the attack path and the network backbone
do not need to be responsible for any function of the DPM
traceback process.
4.3 Discussion
In summary, DPM mitigates some of the problems of the
PPM. These are the following: its CPU and memory bur-
den are far less; it improves the false-positive rate; limits
sending the mark spoofed packets by the attackers; does
not require for awareness of the attack path length, the
network map, and the routing in advance; decreases the
number of the required packets for the traceback from
almost 1,000 packets to 8 packets; and the involvement of
the ISPs is limited only to the edge routers. However, DPM
has still some problems such as the following:
• To keep the false-positive rate not exceeding 1%,
DPM cannot scale under heavy DDoS attacks as
discussed above [20].
• DPM is able to trace back up to the ingress interface
of the edge router close to the attacker, not the exact
attacker node.
• Although DPM has higher traceback accuracy in
comparison to the probabilistic marking approaches,
this accuracy is achieved by marking all the packets in
the network.
• DPM assumes that the marking information remains
unchanged for as long as the packet traverses the
network. Unfortunately, such an assumption is not
realistic given the issue of mark spoofing by forged
routers.
The aforementioned four problems were our motivation
for proposing the DFM approach [26,27].
5 Deterministic flowmarking
In this section, we describe our proposedmarkingmethod
called DFM. Based on various IP traceback approaches
described in Section 2, DFM falls into the following cat-
egories: basic principle - marking, processing modes -
deterministic at flow level, and location - source group.
The following are the assumptions of the DFM approach:
• Each node in a local network may change its IP
address.
• Media access control (MAC) filtering is enabled in
the edge router. However, the attacker may change
its MAC address.
• DFM is not an intrusion detection or intrusion
prevention system. It is a traceback system, which
could work with the aforementioned systems to trace
back to the source of the traffic that network
managers or security engineers are interested in.
5.1 Identifiers
DFM uses three identifiers to mark a flow in order to
trace up to the attacker node. These three identifiers are
as follows:
1. The IP address of the egress interface of the edge
router (32 bits): The edge router is the closest router
to the attacker node with at least one valid assigned
IP address to its egress interface. Some previous
researches on IP traceback such as [20] and [31] have
proposed to use the ingress interface IP address of
the first router in the attack path as an identifier for
traceback. However, since DFM should be able to
trace up to the attacker node even if the attacker is
behind a NAT, the ingress interface IP address will
be useless in this case. Since the ingress interface IP
address is invalid, the victim is unable to trace the
source edge router by an invalid IP address.
2. Network interface identification (NI-ID) (12 bits):
This is an identifier assigned to each interface of
either the MAC address of a network interface on the
edge router or the virtual local area network (VLAN)
ID of a virtual interface if the edge router uses VLAN
interfaces. The NI-ID specifies which subnet a traffic
flow comes from. Currently, a router can equip
802.1Q VLAN interfaces, which means that multiple
virtual interfaces can be used on one physical
network interface. Although VLAN interfaces, which
share one physical interface, have the same MAC
address, each VLAN interface has a unique VLAN ID
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so that a router distinguishes VLAN interfaces by
their VLAN IDs. If a network interface is a VLAN
interface, a NI-ID is assigned to its VLAN ID instead
of the MAC address shared with another VLAN
interface. A 12-bit NI-ID, expressed in the range
from 0 to 4,095, is sufficient to represent all possible
network interfaces and VLANs on an edge router. An
edge router keeps an NI-ID table and numbers the
interfaces from 0 to 4,095. Each NI-ID table entry
consists of an NI-ID and the MAC address of a
network interface card. If VLAN interfaces are used,
then the entry in the NI-ID table consists of an NI-ID
and a VLAN ID. Table 2 shows the NI-ID table of an
edge router which uses VLAN interfaces on a
physical interface whose MAC address is ‘C’.
3. Node-ID (16 bits): An identifier assigned to each
source MAC address observed from incoming traffic
from local networks. Each MAC has a unique
Node-ID. Representing Node-ID with 16 bits seems
to be sufficient as it makes possible to address all
nodes on a LAN connected to each interface of the
edge router, even if each LAN is as big as a class B
network (the maximum number of nodes in a class B
network is 216 − 2). An edge router keeps multiple
Node-ID tables, a table for each NI-ID, and numbers
the source MAC addresses of the observed incoming
traffic from 0 to 65,535. An entry in the Node-ID
table is composed of a NI-ID, source MAC addresses
of the observed incoming traffic, and a Node-ID.
Table 3 shows two examples of a Node-ID table.
Marking each flow by a combination of the IP address
of the egress interface (32 bits) + NI-ID (12 bits) + Node-
ID (16 bits) = 60 bits identification data distinguishes the
traffic of a particular node from the other nodes.
The definition of a flow is accepted as a unidirec-
tional sequence of packets between two endpoints that
have a flow ID in common with no more than a specific
interpacket delay time. Flow ID is the five-tuple infor-
mation including the source IP address, the destination
IP address, the L4 protocol type (TCP/UDP), the source
port number, and the destination port number. While this
definition is able to define Transmission Control Proto-
col (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flows, it
Table 2 An example of a NI-ID table
NI-ID MAC address of the connected interface VLAN ID





Table 3 Two examples of Node-ID table for NI-ID 1 and 2








is unable to define Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) flows, as ICMP does not use a port number to
establish a session. For a good traceback method, it is
very important to trace ICMP flows as well because some
(D)DoS attacks employ ICMP flooding attack. To this end,
we define an ICMP flow as a unidirectional sequence
of ICMP packets between two networks that have the
six-tuples as source IP address, destination IP address,
L4 protocol type (ICMP), ICMP type, ICMP code, and
ICMP ID in common with no more than a specific inter-
packet delay time. As used in [32], we define 600 ms for
interpacket time delay to terminate a flow.
5.2 Mark encoding by the edge router
Figure 4 describes the marking procedure of our proposed
traceback method. A 60-bit identification data needs to
be passed to the destination for each flow. The identifi-
cation data is divided into K fragments. Therefore, the
mark contains M = 60/K bits of the identification data
and S = log2K bits required to identify a fragment. We
also take advantage of one flag bit to identify marked and
unmarked packets in a flow. In the experimental results
section, we describe how to store the marked bits in some
IP header fields that are used rarely.
Figure 5 depicts our choice for partitioning the 60 bits
in the first K packets of each flow. The first K packets of
every flow carry the mark fragments including M bits for
identification data fragment, S offset bits to represent 2S
possible fragments and one flag bit that should be set to
‘1’ for the marked packets and ‘0’ for the rest.
5.3 Mark decoding by destination
Figure 6 describes the mark decoding procedure. Each
destination maintains a table matching the flow ID and
K possible mark fragments. We call this table the ‘recon-
struction table’ (Table 4). As described before, the flow
ID of TCP and UDP flows is defined by five-tuples while
the flow ID of ICMP flows is defined by six-tuples. When
a packet belonging to an unseen flow arrives at the des-
tination, the destination creates a new table entry in the
reconstruction table. Then, it extracts the marking bits of
this flow from the marked packets, identified by one bit
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Figure 4Mark encoding procedure.
flag, and writes them in the corresponding fields (Table 4).
After all fragments corresponding to a flow reach the
destination, the source node for the given flow becomes
recognizable to the destination. Using DFM, the destina-
tion is able to distinguish the traffic of different nodes
behind an edge router. As a result, when abnormal traf-
fic is observed, the destination can filter the traffic of each
node.
5.4 Discussion
As we discussed earlier, some previous traceback
researches use hash functions and send the hash values
along with the marked packets to counter the concurrent
attacks. In particular, Belenky and Ansari [20] propose to
insert the ingress interface IP address into outgoing pack-
ets by the first router of the attack path. Because the 32
bits that compose an IP address do not fit into the avail-
able marking space, they propose to split the router IP
address into K fragments. After receiving all K address
fragments, the victim can recover the address by reassem-
bling the received fragments. Their basic DPM method
has limitations to deal with multiple attackers at the same
time with the same source IP address (see Section 4.1). To
counter this problem, they propose to produce hash values
of the ingress interface and send this hash value along with
marked bits.
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Figure 5 Partitioning identification data in the firstK packets of each flow.
Under the same conditions, our proposed method DFM
does not need to use hash functions because DFM first
detects the flow to construct a validmark (see Section 5.3).
Thus, DFM is safer to counter the problem of multiple
attackers with the same IP addresses at the same time.
Furthermore, in our proposed system, it is assumed that
the attacker can change its MAC address. To this end, we
have four potential scenarios when an attacker changes his
MAC address:
1. The attacker spoofs his MAC address with a random
MAC address: In this case, we assumed that MAC
filtering is enabled in the edge router, the attacker
cannot access to the network.
2. The attacker has access to the white list of MAC
addresses and he spoofs his MAC address with an
active MAC address: The current switches and
routers reject concurrent access of more than one
node with the same MAC address, so the attacker
cannot access the network.
3. The attacker has access to the white list of MAC
addresses and he spoofs his MAC with an inactive
MAC address: In this situation, after the attack is
detected by the victim, it can block the attacker node,
using DFM to distinguish the attacker traffic from
the rest of traffic, while the other nodes will still have
access to the destination (victim).
4. The attacker spoofs his MAC address with several
existing MAC addresses in the white list regularly:
After detecting the attack using DFM, the victim
assumes that several source nodes from the same
network belonging to one interface of the edge router
try to send malicious traffic. At this point, the victim
traces up to level 2 of traceback (edge router
interface) and only cuts off the access of all nodes
belonging to this interface, not all nodes that are
connected to this edge router. It should be noted
here that the other traceback methods in the face of
such a situation are only able to trace up to the edge
router and therefore, they would cut off the access of
all nodes forwarded by the edge router.
As discussed in the first three MAC address chang-
ing scenarios, DFM is able to trace three levels up to the
attacker node. Only in scenario 4 that the DFM traces
two levels up to the source network interface of the edge
router. However, this is still much better than the current
traceback methods, where they at the best can detect up
to the source edge router.
It should be noted here that DFM is able to trace back to
the source of the traffic one step behind the ingress inter-
face of the edge router. Every router with a valid IP address
on its egress interface can potentially act as an edge router.
So if a valid IP address is assigned to the egress interface of
the closest router to the local network, then DFM would
be able to trace back up to the source node. However, if
the network administrator defines the farthest connected
router to the Internet as the edge router, then probably,
there are some subnets behind that edge router. In this
case, DFM is able to trace back up to the sub-networks and
therefore, fewer number of routers are required to par-
ticipate in the DFM marking scheme. This is a trade-off
between the accuracy and the number of participant edge
routers in the DFMmarking scheme.
5.5 Practical comparison of DFM and DPM
As described earlier, based on the various IP trace-
back approaches described in Section 2, DFM and DPM
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Figure 6Mark decoding procedure.
fall into the same categories of classification, but PPM
falls in the other categories. In addition, the goal of
the PPM is entirely different from DPM and DFM.
The purpose of PPM is to identify the attack path,
while the goal of DPM and DFM is to identify the
attack source. So we cannot compare the performance
of the PPM directly with the DPM and DFM under
the same conditions on the same network. Thus, we
only compared the performance of DFM and DPM
under the same conditions and on the same network
platform [27].
Figure 7 is a schematic illustration of both DPM and
DFM approaches, and is a comparison between twometh-
ods. To evaluate DFM and compare the result with DPM,
we have employed both approaches on five discrete net-
work traces including Darpa 1999 attack and attack-free
traces [33], CAIDA anonymized Internet traces October
2012 [34], MAWI traffic archive December 2012 [35], and
Dal2010 data sets:
1. Darpa 1999 network traces consists of 5 weeks of
traces generated at the MIT Lincoln Lab [33]. The
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Table 4 An example of the reconstruction table withK = 2,M = 30 and S = 1
Flow ID First Second Identification
fragment fragment
AC100C14055A5585B02A005006
Srcip = 172.16.112.20 Edge router IP = 172.16.0.1
SrcPort = 1370 AC100001 4004005F NI-ID = 1




Srcip = 172.16.113.84 Edge router IP = 172.16.0.1
SrcPort = 4242 AC100001 40080037 NI-ID = 2
Dstip = 85.133.184.23 Host-ID = 13
DstPort = 21
Protocol = udp
first and third weeks do not contain any attacks. The
second week contains a selected subset of attacks
from the 1998 evaluation in addition to several new
attacks. There are 201 instances of about 56 types of
attacks distributed throughout forth and fifth weeks
data.
2. CAIDA network traces contain anonymized passive
traffic traces from CAIDA’s Equinix-Sanjose monitor
on high-speed Internet backbone links [34]. The
CAIDA data set we employed in this work is a
standard tcpdump file from October 2012.
3. MAWI network traces are from a traffic data
repository maintained by the MAWIWorking Group
of the WIDE Project [35]. These traffic traces are in
tcpdump format, and the IP addresses in the traces
are scrambled because of privacy reasons.
4. Dal2010 network traces were captured in 2010 on
the Dalhousie network. Traces were captured from
the main Internet link. Given the privacy-related
issues, data is filtered to scramble the IP addresses
and each packet is further truncated to the end of the
IP header so that all payloads are excluded.
Moreover, the checksums are set to zero since they
could conceivably leak information from short
packets. However, any information regarding size of
the packet is left intact.
Table 5 represents statistical information of all of afore-
mentioned network traffic traces.
We implemented a testbed network in our research lab
(Figure 8). As shown in this figure, one local network for
evaluating our DFM technique on all of the five data sets is
given above. For this purpose, we replayed these data sets
on our testbed network using tcpreplay and tcprewrite
open source applications [36]. In addition, we imple-
mented two real-time programs using Winpcap library by
C++ [37], one for marking and the other for tracing back
the source of the flows for DFM. The marking program
runs at the source edge router and only marks those flows
traveling from the inside of the network to the outside.
At the same time, the traceback program runs at the des-
tination nodes and tries to trace the source nodes of the
marked traffic.
5.5.1 Traceback andmarking rates
As described before, our marking method divides a 60-
bit identification data for each flow to K fragments and
passes it to the destination by the first K packets of each
flow. Therefore, the mark inserted in each packet contains
M = 60/K bits of the identification data, S = log2K bits
to identify a fragment and 1 bit flag to identify the marked
and the unmarked packets in a flow. However, finding the
best number of K is an important issue. There are three
metrics that are important in choosing the best value for
K :
• TR, traceable rate: the ratio of the number of
successfully traced back packets to all packets
• MR, marking rate: the ratio of the marked packets by
the edge router to all packets
• NB, number of bits: the total number of bits that are
embedded to the IP header of each mark-carrying
packet
Our desirable K should result in higher values of trace-
back rate (TR) and lower values of marking rate (MR)
and number of bits (NB). Table 6 presents the relation
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Figure 7 A schematic of both DPM and DFM approaches. Comparison of marking and the traceback procedures of both DPM and DFM
approaches. Blue lines: DPM; green lines: DFM.
between K,M, S, NB, TR, and MR for all four data sets on
DFM approach. For the better understanding of the topic,
Figure 9 presents five charts, each chart for one data set
showing the values of TR, MR, and normalized NB from
0 to 100% for several values of K for the proposed DFM
approach.
The most interesting thing that can be observed in
Figure 9 is that unlike the existing traceback methods
where reducingMR causes reducing TR, in DFM reducing
MR increases TR. It means that DFM can achieve a high
TR with marking a lower number of packets, i.e., low MR.
The reason is that clearly the flows with lower number
of K packets are unable to carry all K-marked fragments.
In this case, decreasing K also decreases MR. As a result,
this increases the number of flows that can carry all K
fragments and it increases the traceback rate, TR.
However, while decreasing K causes higher TR and
lower MR, which are both desirable; it also increases NB,
Table 5 Statistical information of Darpa 1999, CAIDA October 2012, MAWI December 2012 and Dal2010 data sets
Data set Number of packets Number of flows Size (byte)
Darpa 1999 attack data set 6,830,176 414,791 898,704,130
Darpa 1999 attack-free data set 2,765,596 214,114 353,421,516
CAIDA october 2012 241,589,706 20,596,858 72,556,397,639
MAWI 2012 data set 11,6737,412 6,635,840 3,667,8015,695
Dal2010 data set 372,239,644 40,376,143 108,789,054,323
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Figure 8 The testbed network to analyze DFM.
which is undesirable. Since TR is a very important factor
in DFM, we focus on the values of K ≤ 5 that reason-
able traceback rates (around 90% and more). On the other
hand, K = 1 cannot be an option because in that case
the required NB becomes 61 bits. It should be noted here
that finding 61 rarely usable bits in an IP header to embed
marking bits is almost impossible. Selecting K values from
2 to 5 is a trade-off between MR and NB. While lower K
values have betterMR andworse NB, higherK values have
worse MR and better NB. As most traceback methods uti-
lize 16 bits of identification field in the IP header to embed
the marking bits [11,13,15-17], K = 5 seems to be a good
option. It requires 16 bits of IP header and around 12% to
33% of all packets end up being marked. However, in our
implementation it is possible to set K = 2. In this case, we
have better MR compared to K = 5 (around 8% to 15%),
but more NB (32 bits). Based on the previous works on IP
traceback [9,21], it is possible to use the identification, the
flag and the fragment offset fields of IP header as a 32-bit
marking field (Figure 10). Fortunately, the use of the frag-
ment and the identification fields in the IP header affects
only the 0.06% of the legitimate packets [9,21].
It should be noted here that each flow requires at least K
packets to carry all the marking fragmentations. So if the
number of packets in a flow is less than K, then this flow
cannot be traced back by DFM. This is the reason why
changing the K changes the TR in Table 6.
Our results show that marking the first two packets of
every outgoing flow using DFM makes it possible to cor-
rectly determine the origin of 93% to 99% of packets (TR),
while it only requires 9% to 15% of all packets to bemarked
(MR). Moreover, DFM correctly determines the origin of
90% to 99% of packets (TR) by marking 12% to 33% of
all packets (MR) if the first five packets of every outgoing
flow are marked (italic entries in Table 6).
Table 7 shows the evaluation of the DPM approach
on all of our five evaluation data sets, using the same
TR and MR metrics as we used to evaluate the DFM
approach. Although it is expected to have 100% trace-
back rate using DPM approach, actually as it is shown
in Table 7, TR for the DPM approach is less than 100%
because fragmented traffic will be corrupted by the DPM
and there is some fragmented traffic in our evaluation
data sets. If a single fragment of the original datagram
Table 6 The relationship between K,M, S, NB, TR, andMR on all evaluation data sets for the DFM approach
Darpa 1999 Darpa 1999 CISDA MAWI Dal2010
attack attack-free Oct 2012 Dec 2012
K M S NB TR MR TR MR TR MR TR MR TR MR
(M + S + 1)
1 60 0 61 100 7.74 100 6.07 100 8.52 100 5.68 100 10.85
2 30 1 32 98.65 14.13 99.94 12.09 92.91 9.96 97.23 8.60 93.33 15.02
3 20 2 23 98.62 20.51 99.94 18.11 91.76 10.82 96.96 11.38 92.53 18.79
4 15 2 18 98.61 26.89 99.88 24.11 91.03 11.43 96.84 14.12 91.46 22.21
5 12 3 16 98.24 33.18 99.45 30.00 90.56 11.93 96.20 16.70 89.77 25.21
6 10 3 14 78.64 35.54 81.73 32.35 90.11 12.34 92.88 18.62 87.11 27.67
10 6 4 11 66.98 39.66 70.97 36.77 88.82 13.40 86.06 23.17 76.98 33.36
12 5 4 10 64.55 40.63 68.65 37.98 88.48 13.78 84.27 24.75 74.63 35.07
15 4 4 9 60.83 41.26 64.99 38.98 88.08 14.28 81.74 26.55 72.13 37.07
20 3 5 9 59.71 41.69 63.38 39.94 87.64 14.98 77.84 28.37 68.35 39.40
30 2 5 8 59.27 42.28 62.21 41.32 87.12 16.15 74.73 30.66 64.82 42.35
60 1 6 8 58.49 43.43 58.90 43.51 85.95 18.91 70.76 34.14 59.50 46.98
DFM correctly determines the origin of 90% to 99% of packets (TR) by marking 12% to 33% of all packets (MR) if the first five packets of every outgoing flow are
marked (italic entries).
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Figure 9 TR, MR, and normalized NB for different values of K for the DFM approach. (a) Darpa attack data set. (b) Darpa attack-free data set.
(c) CISDA data set. (d)MAWI data set. (e) Dal2010 data set.
is marked, the reassembly function would fail at the
destination.
By comparing Tables 6 and 7, it can be seen that DPM
has higher traceback rate compared to DFM (TR); how-
ever, this accuracy is achieved by marking all the packets
in the network (MR).
5.5.2 Memory usage
The following are the memory usage comparison between
the DFM and the DPM approaches:
• Memory usage of DFM approach in the edge router.
The space required for running DFM on an edge
router is equal to the sum of the required space of
three tables namely the flow table, the NI-ID table,
and the Node-ID table [26]. In our practical (on our
testbed) analysis, the total required space for running
the DFM method was less than 26 KB. Below we
explain the details of each of these tables and the
space required by them:
Figure 10 Using the gray fields as marking field in IP header for
K = 2.
– NI-ID table. For every interface on the edge
router and for every VLAN (in case of
existence of VLANs on the edge router), 9
bytes including 12 bits for NI-ID, 48 bits for
MAC address, and 12 bits for VLAN ID are
stored. Since the implemented evaluation
network has assigned one interface for
evaluating the DFM approach (Figure 8), this
table only requires 9 bytes in the edge router.
– Node-ID table. For every record in the NI-ID
table, DFM stores a separate Node-ID table.
For every new observed source MAC address,
a 60-bit record including 12 bits NI-ID and 48
bits MAC address should be stored. Thus, the
size of this table varies and is based on the
number of unique source MAC addresses that
are observed. The DFM approach utilizes a
memory management algorithm, so when it
does not observe a source MAC address for a
specific period of time, it removes its record
from the Node-ID table. In our experimental
results, the maximum required space for
storing the Node-ID table was 945 bytes.
– Flow table. In addition to NI-ID and Node-ID
tables, DFM utilizes another table called the
Table 7 TR andMR of DPM approach for all five evaluation
data sets
Data Darpa 1999 Darpa 1999 CISDA MAWI Dal2010
set attack attack-free Oct 2012 Dec 2012
TR 99.83 99.98 99.26 99.42 99.33
MR 100 100 100 100 100
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flow table. Each row in this table belongs to
an observed flow. DFM stores 180 bits for
each flow including the following three items:
∗ Flow ID, 13 bytes. For TCP and UDP
flows, the flow ID is the sum of
five-tuples including 4 bytes source IP
addresses, 2 bytes source port
numbers, 4 bytes destination IP
addresses, 2 bytes destination port
numbers, and 1 byte of protocol,
which makes 13 bytes in total. For
ICMP flows, the flow ID is the sum of
six-tuples including 4 bytes source IP
addresses, 4 bytes destination IP
addresses, 1 byte protocol, 1 byte
ICMP type, 1 byte ICMP code, and 2
bytes ICMP ID, altogether 13 bytes.
∗ Flow mark, 60 bits as described
earlier.
∗ Packet number, 2 bytes. The edge
router increases this number by one
in the corresponding flow record for
every transmitted packet. In other
words, this number indicates the
number of packets in a flow. DFM
uses this number for keeping track of
K first packets of every flow.
DFM no longer needs keeping a record of a
flow when the flow is over. End of a flow is
detected by an interpacket delay that is more
than 600 ms. Therefore, the space required for
flow table varies and is based on the number
of concurrent flows. Table 8 shows the size of
the flow table in the DFM approach for each
of the five evaluation data sets. Since the
maximum number of concurrent flows was
1131, the maximum required space to store
the flow table was about 25 KB on our testbed.
• Memory usage of DFM approach at the victim side.
The victim maintains a reconstruction table,
matching the flow ID and K possible mark fragments.
For every observed flow, a 13 bytes flow ID and 60
bits identification data should be stored. Like the flow
table in the edge router, the victim no longer needs
keeping the record of a flow when a flow is over.
Therefore, the space required for the reconstruction
table varies and is based on the number of concurrent
flows.Table 8 shows the size of the reconstruction
table in DFM approach for each of the five evaluation
data sets. Since the maximum number of concurrent
flows was 1,131, the maximum required space to
store the reconstruction table was about 23 KB.
• Memory usage of DPM approach in the edge router.
Since marking process on the edge router by the
DPM approach only stores the hash value of the
ingress IP address, router’s memory overhead in
DPM algorithms is negligible.
• Memory usage of DPM approach at the victim side.
The reconstruction table consists of f parts, and each
of those parts is a 217-bit structure (2d areas, k
segments in every area, and 2a bits in every segment)
[20]. f Refers to the number of hash value functions.
We implemented the DPM approach with the
suggested four hash value functions [20]. Therefore,
the required space for reconstruction table was
64 Kb.
5.6 Authenticated flowmarking
Using DFM, the destination is able to trace up to the
source node of the received traffic by extracting the
edge router’s IP Address, NI-ID, and Node-ID from
the marked packets of each flow. Although DFM has
promising results, in case of a compromised router on a
network path, the marking bits could be changed and the
destination would be unable to identify the origin of the
traffic.
To this end, we propose to add an optional digital sign-
ing mechanism to DFM. A straightforward approach for
the digital signing is to use the RSA algorithm. How-
ever, RSA has two major disadvantages. Firstly, it is very
expensive to compute. Secondly, the memory overhead
is large (128 bytes for a 1,024-bit RSA signature). Thus,
we choose to use the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) [38]. Elliptic curve systems offer
more security per bit increase in the key size compared
to RSA or Diffie-Hellman public key systems. A 160-bit
elliptical curve key is equivalent to a 1,024-bit RSA key in
terms of security. Security is not the only attractive feature
of elliptic curve cryptography. Elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems also are more computationally efficient than the RSA
and Diffie-Hellman systems [39].
If we assume that each edge router shares its own
ECDSA public key, e.g., through a certificate author-
ity (CA), each edge router is able to create a signature
for every flow that travels from the inside (of the net-
work) to the outside with its own private key. Then it
can send signatures along with the marking data to the
destinations. Because a compromised router does not
know the secret keys of the edge routers, it cannot forge
flow markings. The flow-specific information is neces-
sary to prevent a replay attack because otherwise, a
compromised router can forge other routers mark-
ings simply by copying their mark and signing into
other flows. As flow-specific information, we could use
the flow ID.
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Table 8 The size of the flow table in the DFM approach for each of the five evaluation data sets
Data set Darpa 1999 Darpa 1999 CISDA MAWI Dal2010
attack attack-free Oct 2012 Dec 2012
Number of concurrent flows 843 241 1,131 930 1,021
Flow table size at the edge router (byte) 18.5 5.5 25 20.5 22.5
Reconstruction table size at the destination (byte) 17 5 23 19 20.5
The required space for each flow in the flow table is 180 bits and in the reconstruction table is 164 bits (13 bytes flow ID and 60 bits identification data).
To this end, the edge router creates 42 bytes signature
value (size of ECDSA digital signature with 160 bits ellip-
tical curve key) by applying ECDSA signing algorithm
to 60 bits identification data plus 13 bytes flow ID. This
42 bytes signature should also transfer to the destination
along with 60 bits of identification data. Obviously, it is
not a good idea to embed 42 bytes of data to the IP header
because embedding 42 bytes data and 60 bits identifi-
cation data to 32 bits marking field requires at least 13
packets, while looking at Table 6 shows that K = 13 has
a bad TR (64% to 88%). So we decided to add 42 bytes
ECDSA digital signature to the end of the Kth packet
payload of each flow. It is assumed that when this system is
used it would be known that DFM is using ECDSA signing
algorithm.
5.7 Signature verification by destination
As described earlier, each destination maintains a recon-
struction table (Table 4). In the case of authenticated flow
marking, each destination should add two more fields to
this table: one field for ECDSA digital signature data and
another field for the signature verification status (Table 9).
We assume that the destination already has the public key
of each edge router that is participated in the authen-
ticated flow marking method, e.g., by downloading the
public key from the CA. When the destination gets the
signed flow, it uses the sender’s public key to authenticate
the sender. If the two agree, the destination knows that the
author of the mark was in possession of the edge router’s
private key and that the mark is in fact valid; otherwise, it
would reject the flow.
One advantage of the proposed authenticated flow
marking method is that it is optional for the destination
to extract and validate the signature for every flow while it
does not get attacking flows. In a situation when the vic-
tim is under attack, it may use the signature to validate
the mark to find the attacker node. Therefore, the destina-
tion is not forced to always consume its CPU and memory
resources to verify ECDSA signature.
5.8 Experimental results of authenticatedDFMevaluation
To evaluate our proposed authentication DFM method,
we applied this method on the same five data sets as used
above. To this end, we modified our original DFM imple-
mentation in both the attacker and the victim sides to
include the authentication component. In this case, the
program at the source (attacker) side has optional ECDSA
digital signature embedding with 160-bit elliptical curve
key as well as the flow marking component. Whereas the
program at the destination side has optional edge router
Table 9 An example of the reconstruction table for the DFM authenticated flowmarkingmethod
Flow ID First mark frag Secondmark frag Digital sign Identification Sign verification
AC100C14055A5585
B02A005006
Srcip = 172.16.112.20 EdgeRouter IP =
SrcPort = 1370 AC100001 4004005F 42 bytes 172.16.0.1 Verified
Dstip = 85.133.176.42 sign data NI-ID = 1




Srcip = 172.16.113.84 EdgeRouter IP =
SrcPort = 4242 AC100001 40080037 42 bytes 172.16.0.1 Failed
Dstip = 85.133.184.23 sign data NI-ID = 2
DstPort = 21 Host-ID = 13
Protocol = udp
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verification as well as extracting marks, using crypto++
library in C++ [40]. The program at the attacker side runs
at the edge router and only marks and signs those flows
traveling from the inside of the network to the outside. At
the same time, the traceback program runs at the desti-
nation node and tries to detect the source of the marked
traffic and verifies the edge router.
5.8.1 Bandwidth usage
It is clear that enabling the optional edge router authenti-
cation increases the network bandwidth usage given that
an extra 42 bytes signature data is embedded to the end of
the Kth packet of each flow. The amount of this increase
can be observed by comparing the size of the transmit-
ted traffic with and without the flow signing (Table 10).
This comparison shows that performing the optional edge
router authentication and the verification has less than 2%
bandwidth overhead.
5.8.2 Computational cost
To investigate the processing overhead of the edge router
that has direct impact on the network transmission delay,
we estimated the ability of our proposed method by
computing the signing and verification on a 164-bit mes-
sage consisting of 60 bits identification data and the
13 bytes flow ID. This estimation is based on run-
ning our algorithm on a PC with 3.4 GHz processor
and Ubuntu 10.04 operating system. Our experimen-
tal results show that signing a flow at the source edge
router takes about 0.38 ms and verifying the digital sig-
nature at the destination takes about 0.9 ms. Thus, our
authenticated flow marking algorithm takes less than
1.3 ms.
5.8.3 Memory usage
Since the digital signature of a flow is created and embed-
ded to the flow at the time of sending the flow, no
signature data is stored at the edge router. Thus, perform-
ing the authenticated flowmarking method does not need
extra memory.
In summary, it is clear from these experimental results
that the DFM has the ability of tracing traffic to its origin
behind an edge router with high accuracy in practice. This
is achieved only by marking approximately 9% (K = 2 in
MAWI data set) to 33% (K = 5 in Darpa attack data set)
of all transmitted packets. In addition, our authenticated
flow marking method guaranties that the flow marking is
not changed in the network transmission path by a forged
router.
5.9 DFM analysis
To analyze the DFM, we have used the same evaluation
metrics that we used to analyze the PPM and the DPM in
the following sections.
5.9.1 Computational overhead
Like DPM, in DFM only the closest edge router to
the attacker is responsible for marking, and there are
some computational overhead such as preparing mark-
ing information and upgrading marking fields. However,
unlike DPM, DFM does not require to calculate the
hash value of the ingress address. Moreover, unlike DPM
that extracts hash values of ingress addresses, the vic-
tim uses the flow ID as a guide to prevent the com-
binatorial explosion problem [20] in DPM. In addition,
unlike DPM, DFM only marks K first packets of each
flow, not all packets, and the victim extracts marking
information from only those packets that the flag bit
is set, again not all packets. Therefore, DFM has lower
computational overhead than DPM. Moreover, as pre-
viously discussed, signing a flow takes less than half a
millisecond and verifying the digital sign of a flow takes
less than one millisecond by the authenticated DFM
algorithm.
Table 10 The size of the transmitted traffic with and without the source edge router authentication in bytes
Data set K Marking without authentication Marking with authentication Increment (%)
Darpa attack 2 353,421,516 360,828,636 2.09
5 353,421,516 359,394,340 1.69
Darpa attack-free 2 898,704,130 915,913,630 1.91
5 898,704,130 912,723,914 1.56
CISDA 2 72,556,397,639 72,701,839,187 0.2
5 72,556,397,639 72,618,776,795 0.08
MAWI 2 3,667,8015,695 36,821,053,121 0.39
5 3,667,8015,695 36,804,518,141 0.34
Dal2010 2 108,789,054,323 109,441,443,893 0.60
5 108,789,054,323 109,257,225,173 0.43
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5.9.2 Memory overhead
Like PPM and DPM, memory overhead on the routers in
DFM is negligible (about 25 Kb), and at the victim side,
DFM requires a small reconstruction table (23 Kb). This is
even less than the DPM requirements (64 Kb).
5.9.3 False positives
As discussed earlier, the DPM algorithm uses a limited
number of bits for storing a hash value to prevent the com-
binatorial explosion problem. However, this then results
in false positives in tracebacking an IP address under
DDoS attacks when the number of attacks are more than
the DPM can handle. On the other hand, the DFM algo-
rithm uses the flow ID to prevent the combinatorial explo-
sion problem. Therefore, it does not face the false-positive
rates problem under the DDoS attacks.
5.9.4 Mark spoofing by attackers
DFM marks each flow when it enters to the edge router.
In this case, even if an attacker tries to spoof the mark,
the spoofed mark will be overwritten with a correct mark,
once the flow passes through the edge router. Therefore,
mark spoofing by the attacker is not an issue for the DFM
approach.
5.9.5 Mark spoofing by subverted routers
Unlike PPM and DPM, which do not have any solution
to counter the malfunctioned routers in the attack path,
DFM has an optional authenticated flow making feature
to ensure that the marking information have not been
changed in the network path.
5.9.6 Awareness of the attack path length in advance
Unlike PPM, the process of trackback in DFM approach
does not need the path length; therefore, awareness of the
attack path length is not an issue.
5.9.7 Awareness of the networkmap and the routing in
advance
Unlike PPM, the goal of DFM is not to reconstruct the
attack path, so awareness of the network map and the
routing is not an issue for DFM.
5.9.8 The number of required packets for traceback
With the suggestedNB = 32, the DFM requires two pack-
ets and with NB = 16, and DFM requires five packets to
trace back up to the attacker node [26]. This is lower than
eight packets required by DPM to trace back to the ingress
interface address of the edge router [20] and much lower
than at least 1,000 packets required by PPM to find the
attack path [13].
5.9.9 Fragmentation
Like PPM and DPM, the DFM uses the ID field in the IP
header of the packets, which is generally used for frag-
mentation. Thus, if only a single packet of a fragmented
datagram is marked, then the datagram reassembly will
fail.
5.9.10 ISP involvement
Like DPM, the involvement of ISPs is very limited. Only
the edge routers have to be upgraded to support the
function of deterministic packet marking, and the other
routers in the attack path and the network backbone do
not need to be responsible for any function of the DPM
traceback process.
5.10 Discussion
In addition to all the advantages of the DFM that are dis-
cussed above, there is one more unique feature that does
not exist in any other traceback method. This is to enable
the victim to trace the attack source, not only up to the
source edge routers, but also to the exact source network
interface of the edge router and then, to the source node(s)
located in a local areas network behind the edge routers.
DFM assumes that each node in a local network may
change its IP address, and the MAC filtering is enabled
in the edge router. Moreover, the attacker may change
its MAC address. However, in these cases, if the attacker
changes his MAC address, DFM is still able to trace three
levels up to the attacker node. Only in a case when the
attacker spoofs his MAC address with several existing
MAC addresses in the white list regularly, then the DFM
can trace two levels up to the source network interface of
the edge router.
Finally, as discussed earlier, using the proposed authen-
ticated flow marking method is optional for the destina-
tion in the DFM approach. In a situation when the victim
is under attack, it may use the signature to validate the
mark to find the attacker node, otherwise the destination
is not forced to consume its CPU and memory resources
to verify ECDSA signature.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we presented a survey of two schemes for
IP traceback, the well-known probabilistic packet mark-
ing, PPM, and the deterministic packet marking, DPM,
approaches. Then we presented the deterministic packet
marking, DFM, a novel real-time three-level traceback
method. We performed an evaluation and a comparison
of all three IP traceback techniques from the perspec-
tive of practicality and feasibility. For this evaluation we
employed five different network traffic traces including
Darpa 1999 attack and attack free, CAIDA Internet traces
October 2012, MAWI December 2012, and Dalhousie
2010 data sets, and used several metrics to evaluate the
performance of disparate traceback schemes. The met-
rics employed to evaluate the performance of disparate
traceback schemes are the computational overhead, the
memory overhead, the bandwidth overhead, the traceback
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Table 11 Comparison of PPM, DPM, and DFM
Comparison metrics PPM DPM Basic DFM Authenticated DFM
1. Packet marking rate (MR) Low 100% 9% to 33% 9% to 33%
2. Mark spoofing by Yes Yes Yes No
subverted routers
3. Maximum traceback Edge router Ingress interface Attacker node Attacker node
ability
4. Mark spoofing by attacker Yes No No No
5. Computational overhead Low Low Low Fair
on routers
6. Computational overhead High Low Low Fair
on victim
7. Memory overhead Low Low Low Low
on routers
8. Memory overhead High Low Low Low
on victim
9. Bandwidth overhead No No No Low
10. Traceback rate (TR) Low Good Fair Fair
11. False-positive rate High Low, except heavy Low Low
DDoS attacks
12. Number of required 1,000 8 2 or 5 2 or 5
packets for traceback
13. Awareness of the attack Yes No No No
path length in advance
14. Awareness of the Yes No No No
network map and
routing in advance
15. ISP involvement High Low Low Low
16. Ability to handle No No No No
fragmentation
17. Ability to handle major Poor Fair Good Good
DDoS attacks
18. Number of marking bits 16 17 If K = 2 : 16 If K = 2 : 16
If K = 5 : 32 If K = 5 : 32
rate, the false-positive rates, mark spoofing by attackers
or subverted routers in the attack path, awareness of the
attack path length, network map and routing in advance,
the number of required packets for traceback, the percent-
age of marked packets, Internet service providers (ISP),
the ability to handle fragmentation, the ability to handle
major DDoS attacks, and the maximum traceback abil-
ity. Table 11 provides a summary of the evaluation and
offers a comparison of all three IP traceback techniques.
The results show that DFM reduces the required num-
ber of packets for tracebacking accurately up to 91% on
average with no false positives. Furthermore, the optional
authentication scheme for DFMprovides efficient authen-
tication of routers’ markings such that even a compro-
mised router cannot forge or tamper markings from other
uncompromised routers. This optional feature only con-
sumes less than 2% of the network bandwidth and it takes
less than 1.3 ms delay to one packet of every flow, which
is negligible even in streaming traffic such as voice or
video [41]. Moreover, DFM traces the attack source up
to the attacker node, even if the attack has been origi-
nated from a network behind a NAT server. Future work
will include a more detailed experimentation of the rela-
tionship between the DFM accuracy and the number of
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participating routers. Moreover, we will explore how to
embed an IP traceback scheme such as DFM into existing
security systems and frameworks.
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